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KEEP IT AND REFORM IT
By: Tyler Yeargain1
I. INTRODUCTION
Starting in the 1930s, Maryland no longer required that state
legislative vacancies be filled by special elections, as most states did at the
time. Instead, the state provided that legislative vacancies would be filled by
gubernatorial appointments. Following several additional constitutional
amendments, this system has changed over time, but has largely remained in
SODFH 1RZ WKH VWDWH SDUW\¶V GLVWULFW FRPPLWWHH HIIHFWLYHO\ RSHUDWHV DV WKH
body responsible for filling the vacancy, with the governor operating as a de
facto rubber stamp. Most of the time, this process has quietly operated in the
background, churning out replacement legislators as necessary, attracting
little attention in the process.
%XWWKDW¶VVWDUWHGWRFKDQJH7KRXJKVRPHOHJLVODWRUVKDYe pushed in
recent years to instead require special elections,2 the push has intensified in
the last year following the nomination of Chanel Branch to fill a State House
seat. Branch, the daughter of House Majority Whip Talmage Branch, was
narrowly elected by the Democratic Central Committee for the 45th
Legislative District to fill the vacancy left by State Delegate Cheryl Glenn,
who was charged with bribery and wire fraud.3 %UDQFK¶VQRPLQDWLRQDOUHDG\
mired by allegations of nepotism, was made worse by the fact that she sat on
the central committee in charge of filling the vacancy and cast the deciding
vote for herself, 4 and that reporters were removed from the central
FRPPLWWHH¶V PHHWLQJ 5 Despite the controversy, however, Governor Larry

1

Associate Director, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy.
See, e.g., Len Lazarick, Delegates Want Voters to Fill Vacancies in Legislature, But GOP
Wants to Keep Party Role, MARYLANDREPORTER.COM (Jan. 30, 2015),
https://marylandreporter.com/2015/01/30/delegates-want-voters-to-fill-vacancies-inlegislature-but-gop-wants-to-keep-party-role/.
3
Talia Richman, Chanel Branch Nominated to Replace Baltimore Del. Cheryl Glenn in
Maryland House After Corruption Scandal, BALT. SUN (Jan. 14, 2020, 5:29 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-pol-cheryl-glenn-replacement-20200114dtixp6qxibcnbksxa6f5aeeevy-story.html.
4
Id.
5
Fern Shen, Reporter Booted Out of Meeting Where Chanel Branch Is Voted in, BALT.
BREW (Jan. 14, 2020, 8:02 AM), https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2020/01/14/reporterbooted-out-of-meeting-where-chanel-branch-is-voted-in/.
2
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Hogan ended up appointing her, and she will hold the seat until the 2022
election.6
The response from lawmakers was swift. State Comptroller Peter
Franchot, a candidate for Governor in 2022, called for the state to bring back
special elections. 7 State Delegate David Moon, who had previously
introduced a constitutional amendment in 2015, again pushed for an
amendment to change the way that the state fills legislative vacancies. 8
7KRXJK0RRQ¶VLQLWLDOSURSRVDOZDVWRUHTXLUHLPPHGLDWHVSHFLDOHOHFWLRQV
mirroring FraQFKRW¶VLGHDKHEDFNHGDZD\IURPWKDWLGHDLQWKHIDFHRIILHUFH
opposition.9 His current proposal is to preserve the appointment process, but
to have the appointee only serve until the next general election²which, for
Branch, would have been 2020.10
At ILUVWEOXVK0DU\ODQG¶VV\VWHPVHHPVLQKHUHQWO\DQWLGHPRFUDWLF²
DYHVWLJHRIDWLPHZKHQYRWHVGLGQ¶WFRXQWHTXDOO\DQGGHFLVLRQVZHUHPDGH
by men in smoke-filled back rooms²and therefore worthy of a massive
overhaul. But the simplicity of that conclusion belies its accuracy. Special
HOHFWLRQVWKRXJKREYLRXVO\³GHPRFUDWLF´HYHQWVLQDOLWHUDOVHQVHDUHDOPRVW
always low-turnout affairs held at strange times of the year that ultimately
deprive communities of representation for the vast majority of legislative
VHVVLRQV /HJLVODWLYH DSSRLQWPHQW V\VWHPV OLNH 0DU\ODQG¶V UHIOHFW D
conscientious decision by Progressive Era reformers to push for accurate,
consistent representation and to avoid unnecessary and frequent elections.
7KRXJK 0DU\ODQG¶V V\VWHP LV XQGRubtedly in need of reform, it should be
reformed²not scrapped.
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, in Part I, it explains how
0DU\ODQG¶V DSSRLQWPHQW V\VWHP ZRUNV DQG EULHIO\ UHFRXQWV LWV KLVWRU\
EHJLQQLQJZLWKWKHVWDWH¶VILUVWFRQVWLWXWLRQLQWhe post-Revolutionary Era and
continuing to the twenty-first century. Then, Part II argues that appointment
systems are inherently preferable to²and are more democratic than²special
6

Talia Richman, Gov. Hogan Appoints Chanel Branch of Baltimore to Replace Cheryl
Glenn in Maryland House, BALT. SUN (Jan. 28, 2020, 4:10 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-pol-chanel-branch-202001275eplz5frqnfktplgwpein2jnoe-story.html; see MD. CONST. art. III, § 13 (1936).
7
Peter Franchot (@peterfranchot), TWITTER (Jan. 14, 2020, 6:21 PM), https://twitter.com/
peterfranchot/status/1217270535236792323 ³(QRXJKLVHQRXJK,W¶VWLPHWRGRDZD\ZLWK
the secretive elections that are decided by a handful of votes and violate every recognized
principle of democracy. I will happily support legislation to hold special elections when
WKHVHYDFDQFLHVRFFXU´ 
8
Talia Richman, Maryland Legislators Target Process for Filling General Assembly
Vacancies, Say It Needs to Be More Democratic, BALTIMORE SUN (Jan. 20, 2020, 5:00
AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-pol-filling-assembly-vacancies20200120-b666psl3bvh33facglcs7qktyy-story.html.
9
Id.
10
Id.
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elections because they maximize accuracy and immediacy in representation.
Finally, Part III outlines the changes that can, and should, be made to the
system that will allow it to better reflect the goals of all legislative
appointment systems.
I. MARYLAND¶S CURRENT SYSTEM
,Q  0DU\ODQG¶V ILUVW FRQVWLWXWLRQ provided for a bicameral
legislature, each chamber having different election procedures and different
mechanisms for filling vacancies. The House of Delegates was popularly
elected, with vacancies filled by special elections called by the House
Speaker. 11 The Senate was indirectly elected, by an electoral college
composed of county-level electors,12 and vacancies were filled by the Senate
itself.13
7KLV ELIXUFDWHG WUHDWPHQW ERWK RI HOHFWLRQV DQG YDFDQFLHV ZDVQ¶W
UHVWULFWHGWR0DU\ODQG7KH6HQDWH¶VVHOHFtion process served as an inspiration
for the indirect election of U.S. Senators in the federal constitution, evidenced
by the contemporaneous accounts of the Framers, 14 and for the use of the
Electoral College to select the President. 15 Similarly, when Kentucky was
admitted as a state in 1792, its first constitution provided for nearly identical
procedures for electing state senators and filling senate vacancies. 16
%XWGHVSLWHWKHLQIOXHQFHDQGLQLWLDOSRSXODULW\RI0DU\ODQG¶VV\VWHP
it quickly broke down. Though one-person-one-vote was a concept that
11

MD. CONST. art. II (1776).
See id. arts. XIV, XV.
13
See id. art. XIX.
14
Federalist NO.  +DPLOWRQRU0DGLVRQ  ³The constitution of Maryland furnishes the
most apposite example. The Senate of that State is elected, as the federal Senate will be,
indirectly by the people, and for a term less by one year only than the federal Senate. It is
distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the
term of its appointment, and, at the same time, is not under the control of any such rotation
as is provided for the federal Senate. There are some other lesser distinctions, which would
expose the former to colorable objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the federal
Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some
symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate of
Maryland, but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first
entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the
correspondent part of the federal Constitution, have been gradually extinguished by the
progress of the experiment; and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving, from the
salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by
that of any State in the Union.´ see also A. Clarke Hagensick, Revolution or Reform in
1836: Maryland’s Preface to the Dorr Rebellion, 57 MD. HIST. MAG. 346, 347 (1962).
15
John D. Feerick, The Electoral College: Why It Was Created, 54 A.B.A. J. 249, 252 n.34
(1968); Hagensick, supra note 14, at 347.
16
KY. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 12 (1792).
12
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ZRXOGQ¶W H[LVW IRU DQRWKHU FHQWXU\ DQG D KDOI WKH XVH RI D FRXQW\-based
electoral college necessarily meant that some votes counted more than others.
Indeed, it was possible to win the statewide popular vote for state senate
electors but to fail to win a majority on the electoral college itself. And being
LQWKHPLQRULW\RQWKHVHQDWH¶VHOHFWRUDOFROOHJHHYHQE\MXVWDIHZVHDWVZDV
devastating. The electoral college picked every member of the state senate by
majority vote, meaning that a one-vote majority on the electoral college for
one political party usually meant a unanimous slate of senators for that party.17
Moreover, the general assembly elected the governor, meaning that the
VHQDWH¶VFRPSRVLWLRQGLUHFWO\DIIHFWHGWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIDQRWKHUEUDQFK 18
And to compound matters, the vacancy-filling procedure was effectively used
to alter the composition of the senate altogether²in one term, all but one of
the state senators had EHHQ VHOHFWHG WR ILOO YDFDQFLHVDQG KDGQ¶WHYHQ EHHQ
elected by the electoral college.19
In the 1836 elections, the Democrats won 53% of the statewide
popular vote for senate electors but ended up with only 19 electors to the Whig
3DUW\¶V20 Hoping to use public pressure to force a more equitable senate
composition, the Democratic electors refused to convene, depriving the
electoral college of a quorum.21 Their position eroded, however, the following
month in the State House elections, when Whigs won a commanding majority,
and the Democratic electors allowed the electoral college to convene, which
in turn elected a unanimous Whig Senate. 22 But the new general assembly,
though dominated by Whigs, was sympathetic to the process arguments raised
by the Democrats. The assembly pushed for transformative constitutional
changes, which included making the Governor and State Senate popularly
elected and requiring special elections to fill senate vacancies. 23
This system remained in place for almost a century. But in 1935, the
Maryland general assembly decided to switch gears.24 Beginning two decades
prior, a handful of states began amending their constitutions and statutes to
17

Hagensick, supra note 14, at 347±48. However, in 1826, after the National Republicans
won a majority on the senate electoral college based, in part, on their pledge to appoint a
bipartisan senate, the Senate was composed of eleven National Republicans and four
Federalists. It was the only time that the Senate was not unanimously controlled by one
party. Tyler Yeargain, The Legal History of State Legislative Vacancies and Temporary
Appointments, 28 J.L. & POL¶Y 564, 578 n.69 (2020).
18
MD. CONST. art. XXV (1776).
19
Hagensick, supra note 14, at 347±48.
20
Id. at 350.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 353±56.
23
MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 6 (amended 1837); HERBERT CHARLES SMITH & JOHN T. WILLIS,
MARYLAND POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: DEMOCRATIC DOMINANCE 137±38 (2012);
Hagensick, supra note 14, at 357.
24
Yeargain, supra note 18, at, 592±93.
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fill legislative vacancies, at least some of the time, through temporary
appointments. 25 Many of these appointment procedures had same-party
requirements²that is, whomever was granted the power of appointment, be
it the governor, county commission, or even local party officials, was required
to fill the vacancy with someone of the same party as the previous
incumbent. 26 These changes, firmly rooted in the Progressive movement,
were adopted with the same vein of thought as the Seventeenth Amendment,
the short-ballot movement, unicameralism, proportional representation, and
the Model State Constitution.27
The Maryland constitutional amendment that was drafted by the
general assembly in 1935, and approved by the voters in 1936, provided for a
same-party appointment system.28 When a vacancy occurred, the state party
ZLWKZKRPWKHSUHYLRXVOHJLVODWRUKDGEHHQ³DIILOLDWHG´ZDVHPSRZHUHGWR
draft a list of nominees, one of whom would be selected to fill the seat by the
Governor.29 Subsequent amendments in 1966, 1978, and 1986 made small
changes to this provision, but largely kept it intact.30 The 1966 amendment
transferred the power from the state party to its county-level central
committees,31 the 1978 amendment clarified what would occur if there was
no central committee to draft a list of nominees,32 and the 1986 amendment
FODULILHGWKDWSDUW\DIILOLDWLRQZDVGHWHUPLQHG³DWWKHWLPHRIWKHODVWHOHFWLRQ
RUDSSRLQWPHQW´33
The procedure is relatively simple. If a legislator vacates their seat, the
county-level central committees nominate a replacement, who is then
appointed by the governor and serves out the remainder of the term.34 Though
the constitution implies that the committees are only meant to nominate one
name, the state attorney general has clarified that if they nominate more than
one name, the governor must pick one of the two. 35 If the district includes
25

Id. at 588-89, 591.
Id. at 589-93.
27
Id. at 588-89, 593.
28
MD. CONST. art. III, § 13 (1936).
29
Id.
30
DAN FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 139-40
(2011).
31
MD. CONST. art. III, § 13 (1967).
32
MD. CONST. art. III, § 13 (1979).
33
MD. CONST. art. III, § 13 (amended 1987).
34
Id.
35
Friedman, supra QRWHDW TXRWLQJ2S0G$WW¶\ Gen. 241 (Oct. 19, 1977)).
)URPFRQWH[WWKLVPD\RUPD\QRWEHFOHDU7KHFRQVWLWXWLRQPHUHO\SURYLGHV³WKH
Governor shall appoint a person to fill such vacancy from a person whose name shall be
VXEPLWWHGWRKLPLQZULWLQJ>@´MD. CONST. art. III, § 13. 7KDW¶VDUHODWLYHO\YDJXH
sentence²LWFRXOGEHUHDGWRHPSRZHUWKHFHQWUDOFRPPLWWHHWRVHOHFWRQHQDPH ³a
SHUVRQ´ RUPRUHWKDQRQHZLWKWKH*RYHUQRUSLFNLQJDPRQJWKHP ³WKH*RYHUQRUVKDOO
appoint a person to fill such vacancy from´ ,IWDNLQJLQWRDccount how other states fill
26
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more than one county, the central committees from each county cast one vote
in favor of a nominee²LIWKHUH¶VDWLHDOOQDPHVDUHIRUZDUGHGWRWKHJRYHUQRU
for selection.36 And if the previous legislator was elected as an independent
or as a member of a minor party without a central committee, the governor
FDQ SLFN ZKRPHYHU WKH\ OLNH VR ORQJ DV WKH QRPLQHH LV ³IURP WKH VDPH
political party, if any, as that of the vacatLQJ'HOHJDWHRU6HQDWRU>@´37
'HVSLWH WKLV VLPSOLFLW\ KRZHYHU WKHUH¶V VRPH DPELJXLW\ :KDW
happens if the Governor refuses to select the single name submitted to him?
Other states, like Kansas and North Carolina, make it clear that the nominee
is seated anyway,38 EXW0DU\ODQGGRHVQ¶W7KLVPD\QRWHQGXSEHLQJDSXUHO\
hypothetical question. Though Governor Hogan ended up appointing Chanel
Branch to fill the vacancy discussed earlier,39 some groups urged him not to.40
6LGHVWHSSLQJ DOWRJHWKHU WKH GHEDWH DERXW %UDQFK¶V TXDOLILFDWLRQV DQG WKH
SURSULHW\RIKHUDSSRLQWPHQWWKLVZDVOLNHO\DQDVWXWHPRYHRQ+RJDQ¶VSDUW
His public effusiveness about Branch notwithstanding, 41 he may well
privately concluded that, despite an\GRXEWVDERXWKHUQRPLQDWLRQLWZDVQ¶W
worth triggering a small constitutional crisis (especially one with no obvious
resolution) and upsetting two members of a politically connected family in
the process. But even though the Governor opted against declining to appoint
WKHSDUW\FRPPLWWHH¶VGHVLJQHHLQthis LQVWDQFHLW¶VHQWLUHO\FRQFHLYDEOHWKDW
another, similar scenario could present itself in the future²especially when
WKHUH¶VGLYLGHGJRYHUQPHQWDJDLQ
II. THE MERITS OF LEGISLATIVE APPOINTMENT SYSTEMS
legislative vacancies through same-party appointments, both interpretations have points in
their favor.
36
Id.; Friedman, supra note 30 at 94.
37
MD. CONST. art. III, § 13(a)(3).
38
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25- J  ³,QWKHHYHQWWKHJRYHUQRURUOLHXWHQDQWJRYHUQRUIDLOVWR
appoint any person as required by this subsection after receiving a lawfully executed
certificate hereunder, such person shall be deemed to have been so appointed
notwithstanding such IDLOXUH´ N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163- D  ³,IWKH*RYHUQRUIDLOVWR
make the appointment within the required period, he shall be presumed to have made the
appointment and the legislative body to which the appointee was recommended is directed
to seat the appointee as a member in good standing for the duration of the unexpired
WHUP´ 
39
Press Release, Office of Governor Larry Hogan, Governor Hogan Appoints Chanel
Branch to the Maryland House of Delegates (Jan. 27, 2020), https://governor.maryland.gov/
2020/01/27/governor-hogan-appoints-chanel-branch-to-the-maryland-house-of-delegates/;
see also Richman, supra note 6.
40
Richman, supra note 6.
41
Press Release, supra note 40 ³µI am confident that Chanel Branch will represent the
citizens of Baltimore City admirably in her new role as state delegate,¶ said Governor
Hogan. µI offer Ms. Branch my sincere congratulations and look forward to working with
her during this legislative session.¶´ 
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It may seem counterintuitive to argue that legislative appointment
systems are more protective of the right to vote than actual elections where
actual voters vote. But they are, as this Part argues. One of the best measures
of the strength of a country¶VGHPRFUDWLFLQVWLWXWLRQVLVZKHWKHUWKHUHVXOWVRI
an election match the intent of the voters. Admittedly, there is no federal
constitutional requirement that all election results match voter intent²a
FRQFOXVLRQPDGHSDLQIXOO\FOHDUE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶s recent abstention in
Rucho v. Common Cause, when it dismissed partisan gerrymandering as a
non-MXVWLFLDEOH ³SROLWLFDO TXHVWLRQ´ 42 %XW LW¶V VLJQLILFDQW WKDW LQWHUQDWLRQDO
human rights agreements generally frame the right to democratic governance
as results matching intent,43 ZKLFKUHIOHFWV³WKHLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKH
exercise of individual rights of equal participation in the political process and
an outcome of a political process that allows a relatively full, free, and equal
participation ± the agJUHJDWHZLOORILQGLYLGXDOSDUWLFLSDQWV´44
Moreover, landmark Supreme Court cases involving the application
of one-person-one-vote, like Gray v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims, have
effectively mandated that results match intent, insofar as they require the
winner of the popular vote to be the winner of the election. 45 Obviously,
42

See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, § 3, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N. Doc.
$5(6 ,,,  'HF  ³7KHZLOORIWKHSHRSOHshall be the basis of the authority
of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
SURFHGXUHV´  HPSKDVLVDGGHG 7KLVFRQQHFWLRQRIWKH³DXWKRULW\RIJRYHUQPHQW´WRWKH
³ZLOORIWKHSHRSOH´LQKHUHQWO\UHFRJQL]HVDVLWPXVWWKDWDJRYHUQPHQW¶VDXWKRULW\VWHPV
from voter intent.
44
Jordan J. Paust, The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related Forms
of Social Violence: Testing the Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY L.J. 545, 566 (1983); see
also Steven Wheatley, Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective, 51 INT¶L
& COMPARATIVE L.Q. ;   ³7KHNH\WHVWIRUWKHYDOLGLW\RIDQHOHFWRUDOV\VWHP
in the phraseology of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), is that they must
EHµJHQXLQH¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\DFFXUDWHO\UHIOHFWWKHZLOORIWKHSHRSOH>@´ +DOOLH
Ludsin, Returning Sovereignty to the People, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 97, 146 (2013)
³8QGHUFODVVLFDOGHPRFUDWLFWKHRU\DQGLQOLQHZLWK5RXVVHDXWKHZLOORIWKHSHRSOHLV
expUHVVHGWKURXJKHOHFWLRQVLQZKLFKWKHPDMRULW\GHWHUPLQHVWKHRXWFRPH´ 
45
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964) ³Overweighting and overvaluation of
the votes of those living here has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of the
votes of those living there. The resulting discrimination against those individual voters
living in disfavored areas is easily demonstrable mathematically. Their right to vote is
simply not the same right to vote as that of those living in a favored part of the State. Two,
five, or 10 of them must vote before the effect of their voting is equivalent to that of their
favored neighbor.´ *UD\Y6DQGHUV86  ³7KH&RXUWKDVFRQVLVWHQWO\
recognized that all qualified voteUVKDYHDFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\SURWHFWHGULJKWµWRFDVWWKHLU
EDOORWVDQGKDYHWKHPFRXQWHGDW&RQJUHVVLRQDOHOHFWLRQV¶µ>7@KHULJKWWRKDYHRQH¶V
YRWHFRXQWHG¶KDVWKHVDPHGLJQLW\DVµWKHULJKWWRSXWDEDOORWLQDER[¶$QGWKHVH
43
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beyond just the impact of gerrymandering, the continued presence of the
Electoral College and the undemocratic nature of the U.S. Senate all-toofrequently means that election results don’t PDWFKYRWHU¶VLQWHQW%XWWKRVH
SURFHGXUHV DUH VSHOOHG RXW E\ WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ DQG GRQ¶W UXQ DIRXO RI WKH
Fourteenth Amendment for that reason²if they were implemented at the state
OHYHO WKH\¶G DOPRVW DVVXUHGO\ EH VWUXFN GRZQ DV RQH-person-one-vote
requirements.46
So, if the goal of an election outcome is for it to match the intent of
the voters, same-party legislative appointment systems do a substantially
better job than special elections. On a practical level, appointment systems
capture the most important parts of representation: partisan affiliation and
LGHRORJ\7KRXJKLW¶VRIWUHSHDWHGWKDWYRWHUV³YRWHIRUWKHSHUVRQQRWWKH
SDUW\´ 47 LW¶V DQ DSKRULVP WKDW VLPSO\ LVQ¶W WUXH 7KRXJK WLFNHW-splitting
rights must be recognized in any preliminary election that in fact determines the true weight
a vote will have. The concept of political equality in the voting booth contained in the
Fifteenth Amendment extends to all phases of state elections . . . once the class of voters is
chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which equality of
YRWLQJSRZHUPD\EHHYDGHG´ see also; Gordon E. Baker, One Man, One Vote, and
“Political Fairness”—Or, How the Burger Court Found Happiness by Rediscovering
Reynolds v. Sims, 23 EMORY L.J. 701, 707 (1974) ) GLVFXVVLQJWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VJRDORI
³UHSUHVHQWDWLYHHTXDOLW\´ 5REHUW*'L[RQ-UThe Warren Court Crusade for the Holy
Grail of “One Man-One Vote”, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 268-69 (1969) (discussing the goal
RI³YRWHUHTXDOLW\´ 
46
See, e.g., Sims86DW ³>7@KHVR-called federal analogy is inapplicable as a
VXVWDLQLQJSUHFHGHQWIRUVWDWHOHJLVODWLYHDSSRUWLRQPHQWV´ Sanders86DW ³7KH
inclusion of the electoral college in the Constitution, as the result of specific historical
concerns, validated the collegiate principle despite its inherent numerical inequality, but
LPSOLHGQRWKLQJDERXWWKHXVHRIDQDQDORJRXVV\VWHPE\D6WDWHLQDVWDWHZLGHHOHFWLRQ´ 
Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213,
   QRWLQJWKDW³WKHHTXLSURSRUWLRQDOVWDQGDUG´RIRQH-person-one-YRWH³GRHVQRW
DSSO\WRPDQ\LPSRUWDQWSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´OLNHWKH(OHFWRUDO&ROOHJHDQGWKH86
Senate); James Shinn Graham, Note, One Person-One Vote: The Presidential Primaries
and Other National Convention Delegate Selection Processes, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 268
(1972±  ³,WLVRQO\EHFDXVHWKHHOHFWRUDOFROOHJHLVHQJUDLQHGLQWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQWKDWLW
escapes scrutiny under one person-RQHYRWHVWDQGDUGV´ 0LFKDHO-2¶6XOOLYDQ1RWH
Artificial Unit Voting and the Electoral College, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2421, 2433±36 (1992)
QRWLQJWKDWWKH³XQLWV\VWHP´XVHGE\WKH(OHFWRUDO&ROOHJHLVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDODW the state
level). MSNBC host Chris Hayes made a similar point more recently, see All in with Chris
Hayes 061%&WHOHYLVLRQEURDGFDVW$XJ  ³7KHZHLUGHVWWKLQJDERXWWKH
(OHFWRUDO&ROOHJHLVWKHIDFWWKDWLILWZDVQ¶WVSHFLILFDOO\LQWKH&RQVWLWXtion for the
SUHVLGHQF\LWZRXOGEHXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO´ DQGZDVDWWDFNHGE\VRPHFRQVHUYDWLYH
historians for it. See, e.g., Jay Cost, Chris Hayes and Progressives’ Lack of Respect for the
Constitution, NAT¶L REV. (Sept. 3, 2019, 3:38 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/09/chris-hayes-and-progressives-lack-of-respect-forthe-constitution/.
47
E.g., Paul H. Rubin, Vote for the Party, Not the Person, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2008,
12:01 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122506895498170731.
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increased by some measures in the 1980s and 1990s, it unequivocally started
decreasing by the early 2000s,48 DQGLQPRVWUHFHQW86HOHFWLRQVLW¶VEHHQ
virtually nonexistent.49 7KLVLVEHFDXVHSDUW\LGHQWLILFDWLRQLV³RQHRIWKHPRVW
important factors, if not the single most important factor, in models of voting
EHKDYLRULQWKH$PHULFDQSXEOLF´DQGYRWHUVYRWHEDVHGRQWKHLUSDUWLVDQVKLS
and ideology in all elections²even in ostensibly nonpartisan ones.50
All of this is to say that same-party legislative appointment procedures
guarantee, with near-total accuracy, that most voters will be accurately
represented in the ways that matter most following a state legislative vacancy.
If voters voted for a Democrat in the last regularly scheduled general election,
they will continue to be represented by a Democrat in the legislature²
regardless of whether the specific person for whom they voted lives, dies, or
is elected to another office. It is unlikely that the replacement will differ from
her predecessor ideologically, 51 though it may be the case that party
FRPPLWWHHV DV LQ 0DU\ODQG¶V FDVH ZLOO VRPHWLPHV VHOHFW LQGLYLGXDO
OHJLVODWRUV WKDW WKHLU SULPDU\ YRWHUV ZRXOGQ¶W SLFN LQ D SULPDU\ %XW LW¶V
improbable that a party committee would select a replacement legislator that
LWVSDUW\¶VSULPDU\ YRWHUVRUWKHGLVWULFW¶VHOHFWRUDWHDVDZKROHZRXOGUHMHFW
as ideologically incompatible.52 Little data exists on this question, but that
which does suggests that party-selected legislative replacements are actually
48

David C. Kimball, A Decline in Ticket Splitting and the Increasing Salience of Party
Labels, in MODELS OF VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: THE 2000 U.S. ELECTION 161,
161 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2004).
49
E.g., Drew Desilver, Split-Ticket Districts, Once Common, Are Now Rare, PEW RES. CTR.
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/08/split-ticket-districtsonce-common-are-now-rare/; Geoffrey Skelley, Split-Ticket Voting Hit a New Low in 2018
Senate and Governor Races, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 19, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/split-ticket-voting-hit-a-new-low-in-2018-senate-andgovernor-races/.
50
E.g., Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, Party Identification and Vote Choice in
Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections, 37 POLITICAL BEHAV. 43, 44, 61±62 (2015).
51
See Seth Masket & Boris Shor, Primary Electores vs. Party Elites: Who are the
Polarizers? (May 8, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author (concluding that
there is no ideological difference between elected and appointed legislators in Colorado and
,OOLQRLV $UDUHFDVHPD\EHVHHQLQWKHKRZWKHYDFDQF\LQ,OOLQRLV¶VWK6WDWH+RXVH
District was filled. The incumbent, Jerry Costello II, a conservative Democrat, was
DSSRLQWHGWR*RYHUQRU-%3ULW]NHU¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLRQDQG1DWKDQ5HLW]ZDVDSSRLQWHGWR
replace him. Joseph Bustos, New State Rep. Nathan Reitz Will Be a Pivotal Vote on the
Graduated Income Tax, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (May 24, 2019, 10:38 AM),
https://www.bnd.com/news/local/article230748774.html. Reitz ended up supporting a
graduated income tax, which Costello had opposed, triggering allegations from the state
Republican Party that Reitz was appointed to replace Costello in a ³FRQVHUYDWLYHYRWH
UHSODFHPHQW´Illinois Moves Closer to Graduated Income Tax, WSIL TV NEWS (May 28,
2019, 1:17 AM), https://wsiltv.com/2019/05/28/illinois-moves-closer-to-graduated-incometax/; Bustos, supra.
52
See generally Masket & Shor, supra note 47 at 61-62.
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likelier to be re-elected than voter-selected candidates.53 This conclusion is
true even when controlling for uncontested elections and even when
comparing elected and appointed first-term legislators seeking re-election.54
Special elections, meanwhile, are likelier to have results inconsistent
ZLWK WKH GHVLUHV RI WKH GLVWULFW¶V HOHFWRUDWH :KHQ VSHFLDO HOHFWLRQV DUH
VFKHGXOHG WKH\¶UH XVXDOO\ UHTXLUHG WR WDNH SODFH ZLWKLQ D VWDWXWRULO\
established period of time, 55 which places them at bizarre and seemingly
random times during the year. Some states have moved to consolidate
elections, to provide more predictability as to when elections occur, 56 but
these states are far in the minority. Instead, in most cases, special elections
are scheduled for otherwise-random Tuesdays. 57 This randomness can be
exacerbated by scheduling special elections for days of the week other than
Tuesday, as governors in several Midwestern states have done in the past few
years.58
53

See generally Seth E. Masket, Do Voters and Insiders Nominate the Same Sort of
Candidates? A Look at Legislative Vacancy Appointments in Illinois and Colorado, in
Presentation at the UCLA Department of Political Science (May 11, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). But see Keith Hamm & David M. Olson, Midsession
Vacancies: Why Do State Legislators Exit and How Are They Replaced?, in CHANGING
PATTERNS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE CAREERS 127, 144±45 (Gary F. Moncrief & Joel A.
Thompson eds., 1992) (noting that, based on 1981±GDWDVHW³OHJLVODWRUVZKRILUVWDWWDLQ
office by special election are somewhat more likely to be able to retain the seats than if they
DFTXLUHGWKHPE\SROLWLFDODSSRLQWPHQW´ 0DVNHW¶VGDWDVHWLVOLNHO\preferable here,
because it was a twenty-year dataset with newer data and specifically excluded uncontested
HOHFWLRQVXQOLNH+DPP¶VDQG2OVRQ¶V
54
Masket, supra note 53, at 8±9.
55
See, e.g., MD. ELECTION LAW CODE ANN. § 8-710 (relating to special congressional
elections).
56
E.g., Connor Phillips, The Effect of Election Consolidation on Turnout, MEDIUM (July 12,
  ³6everal states, including Michigan, California, Kentucky, and Nevada, are
considering or have implemented legislation that moves . . . lower-level contests to coincide
with the federal elections held in November of even-numbered years.´ 
57
See Harvey J. Tucker, Low Voter Turnout and American Democracy 2 (Apr. 2004) (on
ILOHZLWKWKH(XURSHDQ&RQVRUWLXPIRU3ROLWLFDO5HVHDUFK  ³Most special elections occur at
unusual times and are the only contests on the ballot. Turnout is unusually low because
contests are poorly publicized and potential voters receive little or no stimulus.´ see also
Marc Meredith, The Strategic Timing of Direct Democracy, 21 ECON. & POL. 159 (2009)
(discussing the year-round scheduling of special school board elections).
58
E.g., Briana Bierschbach, Special Election Results: Keeping the Status Quo at the
Minnesota Capitol, MINN. POST (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.minnpost.com/politicspolicy/2018/02/special-election-results-keeping-status-quo-minnesota-capitol/ (noting that
special elections for the Minnesota Legislature were held on Monday, February 12, 2018);
Mitchell Schmidt, Robin Vos Requests Tony Evers Reschedule Special Election, Citing
Jewish Holiday, WIS. ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2019), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-andpolitics/robin-vos-requests-tony-evers-reschedule-special-election-citingjewish/article_c79696a6-7487-5141-b96f-e8eb927c967d.html (noting that the originally
VHOHFWHGSULPDU\HOHFWLRQGDWHIRUWKHVSHFLDOHOHFWLRQLQ:LVFRQVLQ¶VWKFRQJUHVVLRQDO
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7KHUDQGRPQHVVRIVSHFLDOHOHFWLRQV¶VFKHGXOLQJLVPRUHWKDQMust an
interesting piece of political trivia²it affects turnout 59 and results. When
special elections are held at unusual times of the year, as most are, it increases
the potentiality for unexpected, inconsistent results. 60 Consider a few
examples. In Georgia, Democrats won special elections for the state House in
otherwise-conservative areas in 2015 and 2017,61 which they promptly lost in
the next general election for each seat.62 Similarly, a Republican narrowly
won a special state Senate election in a dark-blue area in 2015, but lost reelection by a wide margin in 2016.63 Much more notably, Democrats won
several heavily-Republican seats in the Oklahoma Legislature in 2017 special
elections,64 but lost several of them in the regularly scheduled 2018 general
election.65
While a handful of special elections serve more as anecdotes than
meaningful data points, the basic principles at play are clear: Low-turnout
district was Monday, December 30, 2019, the final day of Hanukkah).
59
See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 57, at 2 (noting that special elections see low turnout).
60
For example, in Minnesota, special elections for school funding projects, like special
bonds, are statutorily mandated to occur at certain times of the year, unlike in Wisconsin,
ZKHUHWKH\KDSSHQDWWKHORFDOVFKRROERDUG¶VGLVFUHWLRQ$VDUHVXOWWXUQRXWLQ0LQQHVRWD
special elections for school bonds is higher than it is in Wisconsin. See Meredith, supra note
53, at 71.
61
See Maya Prabhu, Georgia Democrats Pick Up Three Legislative Seats in Special
Elections, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regionalgovt--politics/georgia-democrats-pace-pick-three-legislative-seats-specialelections/9KdkpqNX1CrVKyfal4qj7N/ (noting that Deborah Gonzalez and Jonathan
Wallace won special elections to the Georgia House in 2017); Mark Woolsey, Taylor
Bennett Wins District 80 Special Election Runoff, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Aug. 12, 2015),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/taylor-bennett-wins-district-special-electionrunoff/tKDtpotdsYMROfDX4sgmVN/ (noting that Taylor Bennett won a special election to
the Georgia House in 2015).
62
Sofi Gratas, Republicans Retake State House Districts 117, 119 After Just a Year of
Democratic Control, RED & BLACK (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.redandblack.com/athensnews/republicans-retake-state-house-districts-afterjust-a-year-of/article_cad9d68e-e314-11e8-99be-c7cf3c70b2a1.html (noting that Gonzalez
and Wallace lost re-election in 2018); Ken Sugiura, Taylor Bennett Loses State House Race
by Narrowest of Margins, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.ajc.com/sports/college/taylor-bennett-loses-state-house-race-narrowestmargins/K08YNG2Iv24UguEQqu8MCL/ (noting that Bennett lost re-election in 2016).
63
Mark Niesse, Anderson Unseats Van Ness for Georgia Senate, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Nov.
8, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt--politics/anderson-unseats-van-ness-forgeorgia-senate/98r7ieq2x3fop7MONohaWO/.
64
See, e.g., David Weigel, Democrats See Hope in Oklahoma Special Elections, WASH.
POST (July 12, 2017, 6:05 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
powerpost/wp/2017/07/12/democrats-see-hope-in-oklahoma-special-elections/.
65
See, e.g., David Blatt, Oklahoma’s 2018 Elections Were Different in Many Ways, OKLA.
POL¶Y INST. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://okpolicy.org/oklahomas-2018-elections-weredifferent-in-many-ways/.
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elections are likely to be decided by the most intensely interested voters, who
may not always reflect the electorate as a whole.66 :KHQWKDW¶VWKHFDVHDQG
WKHPRVWLQWHUHVWHGYRWHUVDFKLHYHDUHVXOWWKDWZRXOGQ¶WKDYHEHHQSRVVLEOHDW
the most recently scheduled general election²which likelier had higher
turnout than the special²the district is effectively misrepresented in the
legislature until it can correct the mistake at the next election. Legislative
DSSRLQWPHQWV\VWHPVGRQ¶WKDYHWKDWSUREOHP,QVWHDGWKH\JXDUDQWHHWKDWWKH
results of the previous general election remain in place until the next general
election²and they avoid control of the entire state government coming down
to a single special election, as has happened too many times.67
Moreover, appointment systems are better than special elections at
efficiently guaranteeing representation. When a legislative vacancy occurs in
a state with special elections, it can take months to fill it²LILW¶VILOOHGDWDOO
prior to the next election.68 If the vacancy occurs while the legislature is in
VHVVLRQLW¶VSRVVLEOHWKDWWKHYDFDQF\ZRQ¶WEHILOOHGXQWLOLW¶VDGjourned²
UHVXOWLQJ LQ D WRWDO GHSULYDWLRQ RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ IRU WKH YDFDQW GLVWULFW¶V
constituents during that time.69 This delay in scheduling special elections can
be done vindictively or to score political points. For example, Republican
Governors in Michigan and North Carolina delayed scheduling special
congressional elections to fill safely Democratic seats to deprive House
Democrats of two additional members.70 Governors in Missouri, New York,
66

See SARAH F. ANZIA, TIMING AND TURNOUT: HOW OFF-CYCLE ELECTIONS FAVOR
ORGANIZED GROUPS 82 (2013).
67
See, e.g., Ralph Jimenez, With Election Defeat, N.H. Democrats Lose Majority in Senate,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1999, at B19 (noting that a special election for the New Hampshire
State Senate resulted in Democrats losing control of the chamber); See also Joseph
2¶6XOOLYDQWith Manka Dhingra’s Washington State Senate Win, Democrats Plot
Ambitious Course in Olympia, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/manka-dhingras-double-digit-lead-in45th-district-senate-race-sends-message-to-trump-gov-inslee-says/ (noting that a special
election for the Washington State Senate resulted in Democrats gaining full control of the
state government).
68
In neighboring Virginia, for example, a special election can take months to schedule, if it
ever happens at all. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-226, 24.2-228.1, 24.2-682 (2014). In
Maryland, it can take up to 5 months to fill a congressional vacancy if a special election is
called; see also MD. ELEC. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-710 (2020).
69
E.g., Jim Turner, Vacant Seats Will Dot Florida Legislature During Session, ORLANDO
WEEKLY (Dec. 30, 2017, 7:38 AM),
https://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2017/12/30/vacant-seats-will-dot-floridalegislature-during-session ³More than 1.1 million Florida voters won¶t have a
representative in one of the legislative chambers when the 2018 session begins next month.
Resignations and a recent death have created six open seats, with most expected to remain
vacant through the 60-day session because of scheduling requirements for special
elections.´ 
70
Gus Burns, Judge Orders State to Explain Why Election to Replace Conyers Won’t Be
Sooner, MICH. (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/2018/03/
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and Wisconsin have engaged in similarly manipulative behavior when calling
special elections to fill state legislative vacancies. New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo held off on scheduling eleven special elections to the state
legislature to avoid adding uncertainty into budget negotiations and to avoid
upsetting the power-sharing arrangement between State Senate Republicans
and Independent Democrats. 71 Following an unexpected loss in a special
election to the Wisconsin State Senate in 2018, which narrowed the
Republican majority in that chamber, then-Governor Scott Walker announced
WKDWKHZRXOGQ¶WKROGDQ\VSHFLDOHOHFWLRQVWRILOOWZRDGGLWLRQDOYDFDQFLHV 72
only relenting when ordered to do so by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. 73
And Missouri Governor Mike Parson appointed two Democratic State
Senators to his administration, triggering vacancies in the State Senate, which
he announced that he would not fill²perhaps to further reduce the
Democratic minority.74
This sort of gamesmanship can work in the opposite direction, too,
where governors deliberately schedule special elections months or weeks
before general elections. This sort of decision wastes millions of dollars,
burdens county election offices, and increases voter fatigue²so why do it?
The most compelling answer is partisan gain. When U.S. Senator Frank
Lautenberg, a Democrat from New Jersey, died in 2013, Governor Chris
Christie was required to schedule a special election to replace him. Despite
the fact that the state was having its regularly scheduled gubernatorial election
in November 2013, Christie scheduled the election for October, incurring
nearly $24 million in election administration costs. 75 Democrats alleged that
Christie, who was running for re-election and was favored to win, wanted to
lawsuit_says_gov_snyder_is_del.html; Jim Morrill, Mel Watt’s Seat in Congress to Sit
Empty Until November, NEWS & OBSERVER (Jan. 6, 2014, 5:08 PM),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/underthe-dome/article10289234.html.
71
Bill Mahoney, More Legislative Vacancies: Nothing Special for Cuomo, POLITICO N.Y.
(Feb. 16, 2017, 5:22 EST), https://www.politico.com/states/newyork/albany/story/2017/02/the-past-is-no-guide-for-cuomo-and-special-elections-109655;
John Nichols, Republicans Have an Ingenious Plan to Stop Losing Special Elections, THE
NATION (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/republicans-have-aningenious-plan-to-stop-losing-special-elections/.
72
Id.
73
Shawn Johnson, Walker Won’t Ask Wisconsin Supreme Court to Block Special Elections
Order, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 28, 2018, 3:40 PM), https://www.wpr.org/walker-wont-askwisconsin-supreme-court-block-special-elections-order.
74
See Jason Hancock, Group Vows Lawsuit if Gov. Parson Won’t Call Special Election for
KC Senate Seats, KANSAS CITY STAR (Jan. 21, 2020, 3:56 PM),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article239493293.html.
75
Emily Schultheis & Maggie Haberman, Christie Slammed for Special Election, POLITICO
(June 4, 2013, 2:09 EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/chris-christie-franklautenberg-special-election-092211.
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avoid sharing the ballot with then-Newark Mayor Cory Booker, which would
gin up Democratic turnout and imperil his re-election.76
Similarly, in 2018, Texas Governor Greg Abbott opted to schedule a
special election for the Texas State Senate for late July rather than on the
regularly scheduled Election Day in November. 77 When no candidate
received a majority, Abbott scheduled the runoff election for September 18²
less than two months before the general election.78 The result was a surprise
5HSXEOLFDQ YLFWRU\ ZKLFK SDGGHG WKH 5HSXEOLFDQ 3DUW\¶V PDMRULW\ LQ WKH
Texas Senate until 2021, when the seat was next scheduled to be up. 79
This sort of gamesmanship²both in declining to schedule special
elections at all and in scheduling them for inconvenient times²could be
remedied with constitutional amendments or laws that require the calling of
special elections within a certain period of time and that require consolidation
with regularly scheduled general elections. 80 But most states (and the
Constitution) lack these sort of procedures and protections, instead granting
their governors standardless discretion for scheduling elections. 81 And in any
event, temporary legislative appointments followed by special elections
scheduled for the next general election solve almost all of those problems.
76

Id.
Patrick Svitek, Gov. Greg Abbott Announces July 31 Special Election for State Sen.
Carlos Uresti’s Seat, TEX. TRIB. (June 20, 2018),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/20/abbott-announces-july-31-special-election-urestiseat/.
78
Patrick Svitek, Abbott Sets Runoff to Replace State Sen. Carlos Uresti for Sept. 18, TEX.
TRIB. (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/08/13/gov-greg-abbott-sets-sd19-runoff-sept-18-lawyers-say/.
79
Patrick Svitek, Republican Pete Flores Upsets Democrat Pete Gallego in Race for Uresti
Seat, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/09/18/republicanpete-flores-track-upset-race-democratic-friendly-uresti-sea/.
80
The State of Washington, for example, automatically schedules special elections for the
next regularly scheduled general election, which is in November of each year. See generally
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.04.321 (2015).
81
See, e.g., Rhodes v. Snyder, 302 F. Supp. 3d 905, 909- ('0LFK  ³7KLV
statute provides broad discretion to the governor. It does not contain any particular
UHTXLUHPHQWZKHQWKHVSHFLDOHOHFWLRQLVWREHKHOGLWRQO\PDQGDWHVWKDWWKHJRYHUQRUµVKDOO
caOODVSHFLDOHOHFWLRQ¶ZKHQDYDFDQF\RFFXUV5HOHYDQWKHUHWKHVWDWXWHH[SUHVVO\DOORZV
WKHJRYHUQRUWRVFKHGXOHWKHVSHFLDOHOHFWLRQµDWWKHQH[WJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQ¶SURYLGHGWKDWWKH
general election is held at least thirty days after the vacancy occurs´  FLWLQJMICH. COMP.
LAWS § 168.633); )R[Y3DWHUVRQ)6XSSG :'1<  ³>7KH
Constitution] provides that the Governor must call for a special election, but that the timing
of that election is up to the Governor and the state to decide. Although there may be cases in
which such an extraordinary amount of time passes from the existence of the vacancy to the
issuance of the proclamation that it amounts to a de facto refusal to call a special election at
all, that is not the situation before me. The winner of the November 2 special election will
presumably take office almost immediately after that date, and although plaintiffs might
prefer that to occur sooner, I do not believe that the delay here is so long as to amount to a
constitutional violation.´ 
77
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III. HOW TO REFORM MARYLAND¶S SYSTEM
$OORIWKLVLVWRVD\WKDW0DU\ODQG¶VFXUUHQWV\VWHPOLNHO\IXQFWLRQV
better than a special-election system would²all Marylanders are fully
represented during legislative sessions; the state avoids the inconvenience and
cost of special elections; and the ideological differences between appointed
and elected legislators are likely minimal.
%XWWKDWGRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDWFKDQJHVDUHQ¶WQHHGHG0DU\ODQG¶VFXUUHQW
system is unlike most others in the country in terms of the absolute power
given to local party committees, the lack of practical oversight by any elected
official, and the permanency of the appointment. These characteristics make
the current system sometimes veer concerningly close to the eighteenth and
nineteenth century system that the state abolished in 1837 and are worthy of
change. Several pragmatic solutions, some of which mirror what already
works in other states, would satisfactorily improve these failings and create
an even more representative system.
)LUVWXQGHU0DU\ODQG¶V current constitution, party committees have
virtually unchecked and absolute power. For all practical purposes, they are
the ones making appointments to fill legislative vacancies. Though, as
mentioned previously, the constitution is ambiguous as to whether the
governor is required WRDFFHSWWKHSDUW\FRPPLWWHHV¶VLQJOHQRPLQHH82 that
appears to be the agreed-XSRQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ,IWKDWLVWKHFDVHLW¶VZURQJ²
it inappropriately consolidates power in an unelected and unaccountable
organization. Party committees having some say in same-party legislative
DSSRLQWPHQW V\VWHPV LVQ¶W XQXVXDO²most states grant them at least some
power²but absolute control is rare.
7KLVFKDUDFWHULVWLFRI0DU\ODQG¶VFXUUHQWV\VWHPVKRXOGEHFKDQJHG
,W¶V SRVVLEOH WR PDLQWDLQ WKH FXUUHQW V\VWHP¶V GHIHUHQFH WR SDUW\ PHPEHUV
without granting them total SRZHU)RUH[DPSOHWKHSRZHUGRHVQ¶WKDYHWR
be concentrated in the party committee members themselves. Some states,
like Kansas and Wyoming, instead require that a district-wide convention,
DWWHQGHG E\ WKH SDUW\¶V SUHFLQFW FRPPLWWHH PHPEHUV EH KHOG WR VHOHFW D
replacement.83 Moving to this sort of system, while depriving voters in the
legislative district of representation for a short period of time, would introduce
more democratic accountability to the process²and would make the process
more public and transparent.84
82

See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3902 (2020); WYO. STAT. § 22-18-111(iii)(A) (2020). Though
.DQVDVFDOOVWKLVSURFHVVD³FRQYHQWLRQ´see § 25-:\RPLQJGRHVQ¶WLQVWHDG
UHIHUULQJWRLWDVD³PHHWLQJRI>WKHSDUW\¶V@SUHFLQFWFRPPLWWHHPHQDQGFRPPLWWHHZRPHQ´
see § 22-18-111(iii)(A). Nonetheless, the procedure is essentially the same.
84
Cf. Shen, supra note 5.
83
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Second, regardless of which division of the party has the power to
QRPLQDWHDUHSODFHPHQWWKHSDUW\¶VQRPLQHHVKRXOGEHDSSURYHGE\DQRWKHU
political actor. Under MarylDQG¶V FXUUHQW V\VWHP WKH SDUW\ GRHVQ¶W SLFN D
nominee; it picks a designee. In so doing²XQOHVVLWFDQ¶WDJUHHRQDVLQJOH
name and sends the governor more than one name85²WKHSDUW\¶VGHFLVLRQLV
virtually unreviewable. Very few other states have such a party-focused
system, 86 and most grant the formal and practical selection power to an
elected actor. Some states allow the governor to make the final selection from
a small group of nominees, 87 while others allow the county commissions
where the district was located to make the final selection.88
Maryland should implement a similar system. It makes little sense to
grant the governor an effectively illusory power²namely, to make an
appointment²if he has no practical power. Moreover, adding another layer
of review to the established procedure can help prevent abuses and insiderdriven selection processes. Under the current system, if a party committee
selected a candidate to fill a vacancy who was otherwise-constitutionally
eligible to serve in the general assembly, but was corrupt, or had repeatedly
EHHQ UHMHFWHG E\ WKH GLVWULFW¶V YRWHUV RU KHOG LGHRORJLFDOO\ H[WUHPH DQG
unpalatable views, it is unclear what recourse anyone, much less a dissatisfied
voter in the district, would have. But if another step were added to the process,
dissatisfied voters could appeal to the governor or county commission to
reject the nominee.89
Third, Maryland should provide for a system that combines legislative
appointments and special elections by providing that an appointee only serves
until the next regularly scheduled general election. Such a system pulls the
best of both systems²immediate, effective representation and popular
85

See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
MD. CONST. art. III, § 13; N. MAR. I. CONST. art. II, § 9; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3902
(2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-11 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-1-503 (2020); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 111 (2020).
87
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-3, 17-4 (2020); IDAHO CODE § 59-904A (2020); W. VA.
CODE § 3-10-5  ,Q1HZ0H[LFR¶VV\VWHPWKHFRXQW\FRPPLVVLRQXVXDOO\KDV
appointment power²but if the legislative district encompasses more than one county, then
each county commission nominates a replacement to the governor, who makes the final
selection. However, this is not a same-party appointment system. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
2-7C-5, 2-8D-4 (2020).
88
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 15; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1202 (2020); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 5-2-402 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 171.060 (2020); WYO. STAT. § 22-18-111(a)(iii)
(2020).
89
On a practical level, it likely makes the most sense to add county commissions, not the
governor, to this process. County commissions are closer to the voters and are more likely
WREHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIGLVWULFWYRWHUV¶YLHZV$county commission in western Maryland or
on the Eastern Shore, for example²ERWKRIZKLFKEHLQJSODFHVWKDWGRQ¶WUHJXODUO\HOHFW
governors or have power in state government²is likelier to be attuned to the conservative
views of districts in their communities than the governor of an otherwise-liberal state.
86

2020]

0DU\ODQG¶V/HJLVODWLYH$SSRLQWPHQW3URFHVV

17

input²while pulling from the worst of neither. One of the biggest complaints
ZLWK 0DU\ODQG¶V FXrrent system has been the permanency of the
appointments. If a vacancy occurs, say, a day after a legislator is sworn into
her four-year term, her replacement will serve the remainder of the term. By
that point, any antipathy toward the process used to appoint the replacement
legislator may well have dissipated, and by that point, the replacement will
have all of the benefits of incumbency. It is likely for that reason that most
states with legislative appointments make them temporary²the replacement
only serves until the next general election, unless the vacancy occurs too close
to then.90
Though the permanency of the appointment has some appeal to it²
Maryland is one of only two states to elect its legislators to four-year terms,91
so consolidating all legislative elections on the same day may be defensible²
it effectively neuters one of the most compelling justifications for same-party
legislative appointments. The principle behind these sorts of appointments is
WKDWWKHYRWHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHIURPWKHPRVWUHFent general election should be
respected.92 %XWJOLGLQJRYHUDQRSSRUWXQLW\WRVROLFLWWKHYRWHUV¶SUHIHUHQFH
at the next general election, regardless of whether the legislative seat would
ordinarily be up for election, is simply illogical. If nothing elseLQ0DU\ODQG¶V
case, voter turnout is usually higher in presidential elections, 93 when no
legislators are elected, 94 so it makes more sense to have legislative
90

NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 12; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 4, para. 1; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 15;
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-12-203 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-3, 17-4 (2020); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 5-2-406 (2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-7C-5, 2-8D-4 (2020); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 20A-1-503(3) (2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a) (2020); see Nev. Op.
$WW¶\*HQ1R-84 (1955). Maryland is one of only four states or territories²the
others being Indiana, Kansas, and Puerto Rico²ZKHUHOHJLVODWLYHDSSRLQWHHV³VHUYHWKHIXOO
UHPDLQGHURIWKHWHUPLQDOOFLUFXPVWDQFHV´<HDUJDLQsupra 24 note at 31.
91
Number of Legislators and Length of Terms in Years, NAT¶L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/number-of-legislatorsand-length-of-terms.aspx (last accessed Jan. 27, 2020).
92
Supra PART II.
93
Turnout is generally higher in presidential elections than midterm elections. See generally
Robert A. Jackson, Differential Influences on Participation in Midterm Versus Presidential
Elections,37 SOC. SCI. J. 385 (2000). This is true for Maryland as well. Compare, e.g.,
Official Turnout (By Part and County), Election: 2016 Presidential General Election, MD.
ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS, https://elections.maryland.gov/elections/2016/turnout/
general/Official%20by%20Party%20and%20County.pdf (statewide turnout for the 2016
election was 71.98%) (last accessed Jan. 27, 2020), with Official Turnout (By Part and
County), Election: 2018 Gubernatorial General Election, MD. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS,
https://elections.maryland.gov/elections/2018/turnout/general/Official%20by%20Party%20
and%20County.pdf (statewide turnout for the 2018 election was 59.06%). (last accessed
Jan. 27, 2020).
94
MD. CONST. DUW,,, ³7KHHOHFWLRQIRU6HQDWRUVDQG'HOHJDWHVVKDOOWDNHSODFHRQWKH
Tuesday next, after the first Monday in the month of November, nineteen hundred and fiftyHLJKWDQGLQHYHU\IRXUWK\HDUWKHUHDIWHU´ 
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appointments expire in presidential-HOHFWLRQ\HDUVLIWKDW¶VWKHQH[WJHQHUDO
election.
Indeed, this third recommendation is the same proposal crystallized in
6WDWH 'HOHJDWH 'DYLG 0RRQ¶V SURSRVHG FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DPHQGPHQW ZKLFK
UHTXLUHV ³D VSHFLDO SULPDU\DQG D VSHFLDO JHQHUDO HOHFWLRQ >@ EH KHOGDWWKH
same time as the regular statewide primary election and the regular statewide
JHQHUDO HOHFWLRQ´ LI D YDFDQF\ RFFXUV SULRU WR WKH QH[W JHQHUDO HOHFWLRQ 95
+RZHYHU'HOHJDWH0RRQ¶VSURSRVDOJRHVQRIXUWKHU²it does not alter the
SDUW\ FRPPLWWHHV¶ QRPLQDWLRQ DQG DSSRLQWPHQW SRZHU DQG SURYLGHV QR
meaningful confirmation or appointment power to any other political actor.
Piecemeal approaches are understandable in other contexts, but given the
difficulty of amending the state constitution, 96 it makes substantially less
sense here. While public attention is focused on the issue, the general
assembly should use this opportunity to go big and enact meaningful
structural change to the appointment process.
CONCLUSION
0DU\ODQG¶VPHWKRGRIILOOLQJOHJLVODWLYHYDFDQFLHVKDVFRPHDORQJ
way²from an inherently undemocratic system that stifled public
accountability over the State Senate to a system that seeks to balance both the
desires of the electorate and the need for efficient, accurate representation.
%XWDV&KDQHO%UDQFK¶VQRPLQDWLRQKDVVKRZQWKHFXUUHQW approach needs
rebalancing. Maryland can borrow what works from other states²spreading
out the power currently held by the party committees in an absolute
monopoly, adding a meaningful step of review to the appointment process,
and making appointments temporary²and breathe democratic life into a
system that has largely remained unaltered since its adoption in 1936.
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H.B. 103, 2019 Leg., 438th Sess. (Md. 2019).
See generally MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (noting that the Maryland Constitution requires
a three-fifths majority vote in both houses of the assembly and approval from the
electorate).
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